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ROVING BORDER PATROLS IN NEW YORK - 
SOMETIMES THE DRUG SMUGGLER DOES NOT GET 
CONVICTED: 
THE LEGAL LIMITATIONS REGARDING VEHICLE STOPS 
AND CONSENT SEARCHES BASED UPON REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
 





(decided May 23, 2011) 
 
I. THE MATTER OF PEOPLE V. BANISADR 
The defendant in this action requested a suppression hearing 
regarding a search and seizure of marijuana discovered in his motor 
vehicle during a roving patrol traffic stop by the Border Patrol in ups-
tate New York.2  The defendant also sought suppression of incrimi-
nating statements he made to the State Police after his arrest.3  The 
hearing focused on two main issues: (1) whether reasonable suspicion 
was established by the Border Patrol in order to pull over the defen-
dant‘s automobile4 and (2) whether ―voluntary consent‖ was given to 
the Border Patrol agent to search the vehicle.5  Factors to ―support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion‖ were evaluated and the court held 
that reasonable suspicion was established.6  However, the People 
failed ―to meet their heavy burden of showing voluntary consent by 
 
1 No. 2010-079, 2011 WL 2022735 (St. Lawrence Cnty. Ct. May 23, 2011). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at *4. 
5 Id. at *5. 
6 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *5. 
1
Mitchell: Fourth Amendment – Search and Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
788 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
clear and convincing evidence‖ primarily due to a lack of detail re-
garding the occurrence.7  Therefore, the defendant‘s motion to sup-
press was granted.8 
In this case, a Border Patrol agent was on a roving border pa-
trol in upstate New York within two miles of the Canadian border.9  
The area had unguarded roads known for smuggling and the Border 
Patrol agent noticed two out-of-state vehicles traveling together.10  
The Border Patrol agent testified the vehicles were traveling at 45 
miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone.11  The agent stated the oc-
cupants all looked straight ahead and never acknowledged the 
marked Border Patrol car traveling alongside them.12  The defendant 
was pulled over in a rental car with New Jersey license plates.13  The 
agent asked the defendant about his citizenship and whether he knew 
the occupants in the other vehicle.14  The Border Patrol agent testified 
the defendant claimed he did not know the people in the other ve-
hicle, but that he changed his story when the defendant was told the 
other car was registered under his name.15  The agent stated consent 
was then obtained to search a suitcase in the trunk.16  The defendant 
was arrested after marijuana was discovered in the suitcase.17  The 
defendant testified he was a naturalized U.S. citizen with no previous 
criminal record.18  He stated he did not break any traffic laws prior to 
the traffic stop.19  More importantly, the defendant testified he never 
gave consent to search the vehicle.20  Instead, he claimed the keys to 
the car were simply grabbed from the dashboard and the trunk was 
 
7 Id. at *6. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at *1-2. 
10 Id. 
11 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *2. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *2-3. 
15 Id. at *3. 
16 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *3 (stating the Border Patrol agent testified he ―asked 
if he could have consent to look in the trunk and the suitcase‖ and the agent ―said defendant 
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opened by the agent.21  The defendant testified he was never asked if 
the suitcase in the trunk could be searched.22 
The reasoning of the County Court first concentrated on 
whether reasonable suspicion was established in order to support le-
gally pulling over the defendant‘s car.23  In United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,24 certain factors were established and must be taken into ac-
count in order to decide if reasonable suspicion exists to legally stop 
a motor vehicle in a border patrol area.25  Based upon the testimony 
of the Border Patrol agent, the County Court found factors that sup-
ported a conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed in that the de-
fendant ―might be involved in transporting contraband‖ and, there-
fore, the stop was justified to make further inquiries.26  The court 
stated that while these factors may appear ―innocent in and of them-
selves, they must be evaluated collectively.‖27  The ―totality of the 
circumstances‖ must be considered in making reasonable suspicion 
determinations which ―tilt[ ] in favor of a standard less than probable 
cause‖ in ―brief investigatory stops of persons and vehicles.‖28 
The court stated that Border Patrol agents have ―many, but 
not all, of the powers of a peace officer under New York State law to 
make a warrantless arrest.‖29  In New York, prior to such an arrest or 
 
21 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at *4. 
24 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
25 Id. at 884-85 (stating the Supreme Court determined that the factors necessary to estab-
lish reasonable suspicion in border areas may include the following: ―characteristics of the 
area;‖ ―proximity to the border;‖ ―usual patterns of traffic;‖ ―previous experience;‖ ―infor-
mation about recent illegal border crossings;‖ ―driver‘s behavior;‖ ―aspects of the vehicle 
itself;‖ ―characteristic appearance of persons‖). 
26 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *5; id. at *1-2 (stating that the testimony the Border 
Patrol agent provided revealed factors which established reasonable suspicion: the agent‘s 
special training in drug detection, the agent‘s six years patrol experience, the unguarded 
roads in area were used for smuggling, the defendant was driving less than two miles from 
the border, the agent noticed the defendant in one of two out-of-state automobiles traveling 
together, the occupants in the out-of-state vehicles avoided eye contact with the agent who 
was in a marked Border Patrol vehicle traveling alongside them). 
27 Id. at *5; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (stating the Su-
preme Court held that ―[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-
suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‗totality of the 
circumstances‘ ‖). 
28 Arvizu, 543 U.S. at 273. 
29 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *4; (see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.15 (7) 
(McKinney 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.20 (1)(a) and (c) (McKinney 2005); People v. 
Boyea, 844 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2007) (stating ―Border Patrol agents[ ] 
3
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search, the agent must have reasonable suspicion.30  However, the 
Border Patrol agent can always make inquiries about the citizenship 
of occupants in a motor vehicle.31  Furthermore, the ―court reviewing 
whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the legality of 
th[e] stop is required to credit the officer with drawing on his stated 
experience and specialized training that may lead him or her to make 
inferences and deductions about the situation.‖32  Similar to federal 
precedent, factors used to analyze reasonable suspicion must be eva-
luated collectively.33  The County Court held the Border Patrol agent 
here had reasonable suspicion regarding the defendant‘s vehicle in 
that it might be transporting contraband.34  Therefore, the stop was 
authorized and further inquires could be made.35 
The second issue the court analyzed was whether voluntary 
consent was given to the Border Patrol agent in order to search the 
defendant‘s vehicle.36  The agent and the defendant had vastly differ-
ent accounts of what occurred during the traffic stop.37  The focus 
during the suppression hearing was whether the burden of proof was 
met by the prosecutor.38  It is ―[t]he People [who] bear a heavy bur-
den of establishing consent to a voluntary search of a vehicle or its 
 
are granted the powers accorded to peace officers in New York‖ and can perform ―warrant-
less searches when constitutional permissible and effected pursuant to the agent‘s duties‖)). 
30 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *4; see also People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877 
(N.Y. 1975) (stating before a vehicle is ―stopped in a public place . . . officer must have rea-
sonable suspicion‖ and ―reasonable suspicion is the quantum of knowledge sufficient to in-
duce an ordinary prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal ac-
tivity is at hand‖). 
31 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *4; see Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82 (stating 
Border Patrol ―may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status.‖); see also Boyea, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58 (confirming Border Patrol ―reasona-
bly stopped the vehicle to question the occupant concerning his citizenship‖). 
32 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *4; see also People v. Mothersell, 926 N.E.2d 1219, 
1226 (N.Y. 2010). 
33 People v. LaRose, 782 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (St. Lawrence Cnty. Ct. 2004) (stating ―the 
border patrol agent must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal 
wrongdoing something more than a ‗mere hunch‘ ‖); see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (hold-
ing courts must consider reasonable suspicion is established by looking at ―the totality of the 
circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement 
officer‖). 
34 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *5. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at *6. 
38 Id. at *5. 
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contents.‖39  If voluntary consent was not established, the Supreme 
Court has held ―evidence seized during an unlawful search [can] not 
constitute proof against the victim of the search.‖40  In New York, a 
peace officer need not inform a suspect that he or she may refuse 
consent to a search request.41  However, failure to advise of the right 
to refuse ―may be considered in assessing the voluntariness of the 
consent.‖42  The court here ascertained that if the defendant actually 
consented to the search, the warrantless search of the suitcase and the 
―seizure of the marijuana [would be] proper‖ because a ―driver‘s con-
sent to search the vehicle is a valid substitute for probable cause.‖43  
The critical issue in this matter was ―whether the defendant consented 
to the search and if so, the scope of the consent.‖44  The court rea-
soned the Border Patrol agent could have established ― ‗unequivocal-
ly that consent to search was obtained by getting a signed consent to 
search form or, at the very least [the agent could have] made a com-
plete and accurate record of how consent was given.‘ ‖45  Clear and 
convincing evidence was not established due to the lack of detail 
provided and the testimony articulated ―wildly different versions of 
what occurred‖ during the traffic stop.46  The Border Patrol agent 
claimed he received consent and was handed the keys to search both 
the trunk and the suitcase in the trunk.47  The defendant testified he 
was told to put the keys on the dashboard.48  He claimed the agent 
simply grabbed the keys and without consent opened the trunk.49  The 
defendant stated the agent also never asked for his consent ―to search 
the suitcase in the trunk.‖50  Lastly, the ―[d]efendant said that [the 
 
39 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *5; see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 
548 (1968) (―When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a 
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily giv-
en.‖). 
40 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). 
41 People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 581 (N.Y. 1976). 
42 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *5. 
43 Id.; see Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 579 (―[L]imited exception[ ] to the warrant require-
ment and, indeed, to the requirement of probable cause, is voluntary consent to the search.‖). 
44 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *6. 
45 Id. (quoting People v. Hall, No. 01560-2005, WL 1341016, at *4 (Erie Cnty. Ct. May 5, 
2006)). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *3. 
48 Id. 
49 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *3. 
50 Id. (stating the suitcase is where the marijuana was allegedly found). 
5
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agent] came back to the driver‘s side window, pointing his gun at the 
defendant‘s head and said, ‗[d]on‘t move or I will blow your f-ing 
head off.‘ ‖51  The court held the People failed to meet the burden of 
voluntary consent.52  As a product of an unauthorized warrantless 
search, the subsequent statements made by the defendant after his ar-
rest to the State Police were also suppressed.53 
II. ROVING BORDER PATROLS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE LIMITATIONS OF CONDUCTING WARRANTLESS 
SEARCHES BASED UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION 
The right to have control and possession of your own person 
is held to the highest regard in the United States.54  The Fourth 
Amendment protects ―the right of the people to be secure . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.‖55  Therefore, evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded in order to deter 
police from conducting impermissible searches.56  In Katz v. United 
States,57 the Supreme Court stated that what a person ―seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected.‖58  A ―search‖ occurs in an area where a per-
son has a ―reasonable expectation of privacy.‖59  Anytime law 
enforcement ―restrains [a person‘s] freedom to walk away,‖ law en-
forcement has seized that person.60  Searches and seizures are con-
trolled by the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is considered 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *6. 
53 Id.; see People v. Hall, 828 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div 4th Dep‘t 2006) (―[T]he court 
properly suppressed the subsequent statements made by defendant to police and the evidence 
thereafter seized from the vehicle‖ (see generally Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88)); Banisadr, 
2011 WL 2022735, at *1.  The defendant made incriminating statements after his arrest to 
the State Police regarding that he was a ―small player‖ who was paid $2,000 to transport the 
ten pounds of marijuana in his car. 
54 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); see also Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
55 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (―The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.‖). 
56 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. 
57 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
58 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
59 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
60 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
6
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essential.61  An objective standard must be utilized to ascertain the 
specific facts and rational inferences used by law enforcement to rea-
sonably warrant an intrusion.62 
It is imperative to note exigencies are needed to justify the in-
itiation of a search ―in the absence of probable cause to arrest.‖63  The 
police rely on their law enforcement experiences and specialized 
training.  To lawfully take limited intrusive action based upon rea-
sonable suspicion, a police officer must objectively surmise from the 
―totality of the circumstances‖ in a given situation that criminal 
wrongdoing may be in play.64  Reasonable suspicion is a lower stan-
dard than probable cause to conduct warrantless searches.65  Such 
suspicion has been held constitutionally permissible in order to con-
duct certain activities such as ―brief investigatory stops of persons 
and vehicles.‖66 
Border Patrol agents have authority to search for any aliens in 
any vessel of transportation ―within 100 miles of the border.‖67  Bor-
der Patrol agents have no absolute ―authority to search cars, but only 
to question the occupants about their citizenship and immigration sta-
tus.‖68  Border Patrol agents must have a ―founded suspicion‖ to stop 
a vehicle and that suspicion cannot be based solely on the occupants‘ 
ancestry.69  The suspicion must be reasonable in order to stop a car 
briefly to ―investigate the circumstances that provoke[d] suspicion,‖ 
to inquire about citizenship, and for occupants ―to explain suspicious 
 
61 Id. at 17; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 272 (MATTHEW BENDER & CO. INC. 5TH ED. 2010) (―[T]he Supreme Court has 
never quantified the concept of ‗probable cause‘ . . . ‗probable cause‘ involves a ‗substantial 
basis‘ for concluding—a ‗fair probability‘ but less than a preponderance of the evidence—
that a search will turn up criminal evidence or that the person seized is guilty of an of-
fense.‖). 
62 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
63 Id. at 25-26 (―[A]n officer may lawfully arrest a person . . . when he is apprised of facts 
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime.‖). 
64 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. 
65 Id.; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (describing reasonable suspicion as when a ―prudent 
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief his safety or that of others was in 
danger‖ and then ―in determining whether an officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, 
due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is en-
titled to draw from the facts in light of his experience‖). 
66 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. 
67 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 877; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2003). 
68 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874. 
69 Id. at 876. 
7
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circumstances.‖70  It is unconstitutional to simply stop automobiles at 
random because it would lead to arbitrary law enforcement.71  Roving 
border patrols must consider a number of ―factors‖ in determining 
whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop an automobile near any 
border area.72  The factors must not be considered individually, but 
instead, they ―must turn on the totality of the particular circums-
tances‖ where everything is taken into account collectively.73  This is 
because the ―concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract‖ 
and cannot simply be reduced to a particular or fine set of rules.74  
Factors or acts may be innocent if each is analyzed separately; how-
ever, based upon all the patrol agent‘s factual inferences, reasonable 
suspicion and further investigation could arise or be warranted only if 
the series of acts or factors are taken together in a proper analysis.75  
To establish reasonable suspicion, a Border Patrol agent may consid-
er such factors as: ―recent illegal border crossings,‖ ―driver‘s beha-
vior   . . . or obvious attempts to evade officers,‖ ―proximity to the 
border,‖ ―characteristics of the area,‖  ―previous experience,‖ ―usual 
traffic patterns on a particular road,‖ ―aspects of the vehicle itself,‖ 
and ―characteristic appearance of persons.‖76 
Regarding reasonable suspicion determinations, the Supreme 
Court has held the federal courts must adhere to a particular standard 
of review.  In federal courts, ―a de novo standard of review [is ap-
plied] to determinations of . . . reasonable suspicion.‖77  ―[T]he legal 
rules for . . . reasonable suspicion acquire content only through appli-
 
70 Id. at 881-82. 
71 Id. at 884 (―[T]he Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random.‖). 
72 Id. at 884-85.  Factors an agent may consider to establish reasonable suspicion include: 
―aspects of the vehicle itself‖ (for example, heavily loaded, high number of passengers); 
―characteristic appearance of persons‖ (for example, haircut, mode of dress); ―characteristics 
of the area;‖ ―proximity to the border;‖ ―usual traffic patterns on a particular road;‖ ―pre-
vious experience;‖ ―recent illegal border crossings;‖ ―driver‘s behavior . . . or obvious at-
tempts to evade officers;‖ see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (―In all situations the 
officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and 
smuggling.‖). 
73 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 n.10. 
74 Arvizu, 543 U.S. at 274 (stating ―divide-and-conquer analysis‖ of factors is precluded 
and reasonable suspicion can only be established by looking at all the factors, not in isola-
tion, but in the totality of the circumstances involved). 
75 Id. at 273-75. 
76 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85. 
77 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). 
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cation.‖78  Therefore, independent review is necessary for federal 
courts to clarify and ―maintain control of‖ these legal principals 
through the utilization of de novo review.79  De novo review also es-
tablishes greater uniformity.80 
At border stop checkpoints, reasonable suspicion is not re-
quired to search persons and effects because ―[t]he [g]overnment‘s 
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at 
its zenith at the international border.‖81  It has been long recognized 
that automobiles seeking entry into the country can be searched be-
cause the government has a paramount interest in the protection of its 
territorial integrity.82  Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that it is 
reasonable for ―suspicionless inspections at the border [to] include[ ] 
the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle‘s fuel 
tank.‖83  The typical reasonable person understands ―the expectation 
of privacy is less at the border than in the interior.‖84  Therefore, the 
government can ―conduct suspicionless inspections at the border‖ 
where any privacy expectation is much less than in the interior of the 
country.85  In United States v. Singh,86 the Second Circuit held 
―[r]outine searches at the border, or at the functional equivalent of the 
border (such as an inland airport, where an international flight first 
lands), [has] long been viewed as reasonable per se.‖87  However, this 
―per se reasonableness‖ does not apply to roving border patrols near 
the border as they are ―held to a higher standard.‖88  This is because 
―[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that lesser intrusions by inland 
roving patrols need be supported . . . by reasonable suspicion.‖89 
 The New York Court of Appeals has held that ―reasonable 
suspicion is the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordina-
 
78 Id. at 697. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
82 Id. at 153, 155. 
83 Id. at 155. 
84 Id. at 154. 
85 Id. at 154-55. 
86 415 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2005). 
87 Id. at 293. 
88 Id. at 294. 
89 Id. (―By that, the Supreme Court means the officer must have a ‗particularized and ob-
jective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing‘ given the ‗totality of the circumstances.‘ ‖ 
(quoting Arvizu, 543 U.S. at 273)). 
9
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rily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe 
criminal activity is at hand.‖90  In other words, a mere ―gut reaction‖ 
or a ―hunch‖ is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion because 
the requisite knowledge must have some demonstrable roots and ―be 
more than subjective‖ in nature.91  New York precedent is abundantly 
clear that, at the very least, reasonable suspicion is needed that a mo-
torist and ―[any] occupants had been, are then, or are about to be, en-
gaged in conduct in violation of the law‖ in order for the police to 
conduct a traffic stop.92  The absence of the minimum requisite of 
reasonable suspicion would constitute the stopping of an automobile 
by law enforcement as an impermissible seizure.93  Therefore, the 
minimum requirement for law enforcement to pull over a motorist is 
a ―reasonable suspicion of criminal activity‖ because ―any other rule 
would permit police seizures solely if the circumstances existed [that 
presented] a potential for danger.‖94 
In New York, Border Patrol agents on roving patrols may stop 
vehicles near the border if they are aware of specific facts together 
with rational inferences that can reasonably warrant suspicion.95  
―The existence of reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory 
stop is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed 
by the [patrol agent] and its degree of reliability, both of which 
should be considered with the totality of the circumstances.‖96  Bor-
der Patrol agents may question the car occupants about citizenship 
and ask them ―to explain suspicious circumstances;‖ however, ―any 
further detention must be based upon . . . consent or probable 
cause.‖97  The issues surrounding further detention were highlighted 
in People v. LaRose.98  In LaRose, a Border Patrol agent claimed he 
made a reasonable suspicion motor vehicle stop near the border based 
upon the driver making questionable turns and ―the fact something 
 
90 Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 877. 
91 People v. Sobotker, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (N.Y. 1978). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 People v. May, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. 1992). 
95 People v. Carillo, 686 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 1999); see also Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. 
96 Hall, 2006 WL 1341016, at *2; see United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
97 Carillo, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82. 
98 782 N.Y.S.2d 633 (St. Lawrence Cnty. Ct. 2004). 
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just didn‘t seem right.‖99  During the incident, the agent inquired if 
any weapons were in the vehicle and discovered a loaded 9 millime-
ter handgun in the center console.100  The County Court found that 
the Border Patrol agent on a roving patrol received assurances from 
the occupants concerning their citizenship and, therefore, the ―basis 
for further detention ended.‖101  If however, the stop was preceded by 
a traffic violation, then the patrol agent was free to call local law en-
forcement to assist him if he was not trained in the enforcement of 
New York traffic laws.102  The court held the evidence in the case 
suppressed because once the patrol agent had no other concerns about 
smuggling or aliens he ―lacked authority to ask further investigatory 
questions.‖103  The case demonstrates the seriousness of New York 
courts in enforcing the limited authority granted to Border Patrol 
agents on roving patrols conducting traffic stops based upon reasona-
ble suspicion. 
III. NEW YORK OFFERS MORE PROTECTION: A CANINE SNIFF 
DURING A TRAFFIC STOP CONSTITUTES A SEARCH 
The Supreme Court has held a canine sniff is not a search.104  
In Illinois v. Caballes,105 the Supreme Court stated a dog sniff during 
a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search because it ―reveal[ed] 
no information other than the location of a substance that no individ-
ual has any right to possess.‖106  This is because ―[o]fficial conduct 
that does not ‗compromise any legitimate interest in privacy‘ is not a 
search subject to the Fourth Amendment . . . [and] any interest in 
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‗legitimate.‘ ‖107 
The New York Court of Appeals established precedent that 
police must have at least a reasonable suspicion to use a ―canine 
 
99 Id. at 637. 
100 Id. at 635. 
101 Id. at 637. 
102 Id. at 638. 
103 LaRose, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
104 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating a dog sniff ―discloses only 
the presence or absence of narcotics‖ which ―did not constitute a ‗search‘ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment‖). 
105 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
106 Id. at 410.  The routine traffic stop was an individual being pulled over for speeding on 
an Illinois interstate highway. 
107 Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)). 
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sniff‖ to detect drugs around a residence as it constitutes a ―search 
within the meaning of article I, § 12 of our State Constitution.‖108  In 
People v. Devone,109 the Court of Appeals held ―a canine sniff of the 
exterior of an automobile constitutes a search‖ and a founded suspi-
cion by law enforcement is required.110  In New York, the ―graduated 
four-level test for evaluating street encounters initiated by the police‖ 
sets founded suspicion as a lower standard to meet than reasonable 
suspicion.111  In Devone, law enforcement officers pulled over an au-
tomobile because the driver was using his cell phone.112  The driver 
was unable to identify the owner of the car and could not produce his 
driver‘s license and registration.113  The Court of Appeals stated the 
police therefore had ―founded suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot, justifying [a] canine sniff.‖114  A police dog was then utilized, 
which ―alerted‖ the police officer that drugs were in the car, and 
crack cocaine was lawfully discovered in the center console.115  New 
York disagrees with the Supreme Court that a canine sniff is not a 
search.  The New York Constitution sets a higher standard for rea-
sonable searches than the federal precedent. 
 
108 People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990); see also N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
109 931 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 2010). 
110 Id. at 74 (stating a reasonable suspicion standard is required for a canine sniff at a resi-
dence and a lower expectation of privacy exists in relation to automobiles, therefore, ―law 
enforcement need only meet a lesser standard before conducting a canine sniff of the exterior 
of a lawfully stopped vehicle . . . [g]iven [the] diminished expectation of privacy . . . [the] 
application of [a] founded suspicion standard in these cases is appropriate‖). 
111 See People v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining the levels of the 
scaled test and standards to justify the initiation of different street encounters by law en-
forcement indicating founded suspicion at level two and reasonable suspicion at level three); 
[W]e set forth a graduated four-level test for evaluating street encounters 
initiated by the police: level one permits a police officer to request in-
formation from an individual and merely requires that the request be 
supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of 
criminality; level two, the common-law right of inquiry, permits a 
somewhat greater intrusion and requires a founded suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot; level three authorizes an officer to forcibly stop and 
detain an individual, and requires a reasonable suspicion that the particu-
lar individual was involved in a felony or misdemeanor; level four, ar-
rest, requires probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed a crime. 
Id.; see also People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72 (N.Y. 1976). 
112 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 71-72. 
113 Id. at 72. 
114 Id. at 74. 
115 Id. at 72. 
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IV. ROVING BORDER PATROLS: VOLUNTARY CONSENT AND THE 
SCOPE OF VEHICLE SEARCHES ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE 
The Supreme Court has held that valid consent to conduct a 
warrantless search is established by (1) voluntary consent116 and (2) 
obtained from a person with apparent117 or real authority.118  Addi-
tionally, the actual search must not exceed the scope for which the 
consent was granted.119  A ―consent search‖ is ―constitutionally per-
missible‖ as an important law enforcement activity and sometimes 
provides ―the only means in obtaining important reliable evi-
dence.‖120  The allowance of properly obtained ―consent search‖ evi-
dence is crucial in the pursuit of justice, for as the Court so eloquent-
ly stated, ―the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . have nothing 
whatsoever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a 
criminal trial.‖ 121  In the absence of probable cause, consent searches 
provide an invaluable option to law enforcement officers especially 
during suspect late night traffic stops. 
Border Patrol agents may question occupants of a motor ve-
hicle about their immigration status or citizenship and seek an expla-
nation about suspicious circumstances, ―but any further detention or 
search must be based upon consent or probable cause.‖122  The bur-
den of proving that consent to search a vehicle was voluntarily and 
freely given rests on the shoulders of the government.123  Reasona-
 
116 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (explaining consent cannot be 
established as ―the result of duress or coercion, express or implied‖); see Bumper, 391 U.S. 
at 548, 550 (stating consent must be ―freely and voluntarily given‖ and ―[w]here there is 
coercion there cannot be consent.‖). 
117 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (describing the valid use of an ob-
jective standard to be utilized to reasonably ascertain from the given facts that a consenting 
party has the apparent authority to consent). 
118 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).  The Court held that those indi-
viduals with common authority over a home can individually volunteer consent to a search. 
119 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (―The scope of a search is generally de-
fined by its expressed object.‖). 
120 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-28. 
121 Id. at 242-43; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (―[T]here is nothing 
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in 
order to protect the privacy of us all.‖). 
122 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82. 
123 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (stating ―[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to 
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, 
freely and voluntarily given‖). 
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bleness is the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment.124  The Fourth 
Amendment merely proscribes state-initiated searches which are un-
reasonable.125  While it is reasonable for Border Patrol agents to 
search a vehicle once proper permission is granted, ―[t]he standard 
for measuring the scope of a suspect‘s consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of ‗objective‘ reasonableness – what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between 
the [patrol agent] and the suspect?‖126  For example, in Florida v. Ji-
meno,127 the Supreme Court held it is reasonable for law enforcement 
officers, when granted consent to search a vehicle, to search contain-
ers in the vehicle without express consent for each container, but it is 
―unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search in 
his trunk, has agreed to breaking open a locked briefcase within the 
trunk.‖128  Alternatively, a driver, when voluntarily granting consent 
to search, may specify limits to law enforcement and set the bounda-
ries regarding the scope of any consent search.129  Limiting instruc-
tions restrict what is objectively reasonable when interpreting the 
consent granted as duly tailored to narrow the measure of scope. 
In New York, voluntary consent to a search is a limited ex-
ception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, as long as it 
is an unconstrained and free choice by the suspect.130  It must be de-
termined if voluntary consent was actually given or if the suspect was 
simply ―yielding to overbearing official pressure‖ because submis-
sion to authority is not consent.131  The People have ―the heavy bur-
den of proving the voluntariness of the purported consent[ ].‖132  Fac-
tors used to determine whether consent was voluntarily given include 
whether the suspect was in custody, the background of the consenter, 
whether the suspect at the time was uncooperative or evasive with the 
peace officer, and whether the suspect was informed he or she could 
refuse to consent.133  Voluntary consent has been determined to be a 
 
124 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
125 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250. 
126 Id. at 251. 
127 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
128 Id. at 251-52. 
129 Id. at 252. 
130 See Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 579-80. 
131 Id. at 580. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 581. 
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valid substitute for probable cause.134  If the initial motor vehicle stop 
is determined to have been unlawful, then any evidence acquired 
through consent and absent probable cause must be suppressed.135  
The scope of consent is measured by objective reasonableness be-
tween what was understood between the Border Patrol and the driver 
of a vehicle.136  It should be noted that, in New York, law enforce-
ment officers cannot use general consent to perform a destructive 
search of an automobile.137 
Voluntary consent was the central focus in People v. Hall,138 
where during a traffic stop, law enforcement initially asked the driv-
er, ―[a]nything we should know about?‖139  After a pause, the driver 
was asked if any weapons were in the car.140  The record revealed the 
driver was never asked to identify himself, who owned the vehicle, or 
where he was going.141  Instead, the police simply asked for the car 
keys and searched the trunk only to discover a gun.142  The court sup-
pressed the handgun holding the police request for the keys was more 
like a ―command,‖ which meant the defendant‘s consent was not a 
voluntary waiver of a constitutional right, because intimidation did 
not make a choice free and voluntary.143  On appeal, in People v. Hall 
II,144 the Fourth Department affirmed the lower court‘s decision stat-
ing ―[t]he People failed to prove the substance of the conversation be-
tween defendant and police‖ by an objective reasonableness standard 
and that asking the defendant for consent to look in the vehicle is 
―not consent to search it.‖145 
Border Patrol agents must have authority to request voluntary 
 
134 Id. at 579; see also People v. Barclay, 607 N.Y.S.2d 531, 531 (App. Div. 4th Dep‘t 
1994). 
135 See Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 878. 
136 See People v. Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-74 (N.Y. 2005).  An example of scope 
of consent includes easily opened containers in an automobile that could be opened by a 
Border Patrol agent granted consent to search a vehicle. 
137 Id. at 1274 (explaining the use of a crowbar to pry automobile parts open to locate 
drugs is beyond general consent and impermissible). 
138 No. 01560-2005, 2006 WL 1341016 (Erie Cnty. Ct. May 5, 2006). 
139 Id. at *1. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *3. 
142 Id. at *1-2. 
143 Hall, 2006 WL 1341016, at *4. 
144 828 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 4th Dep‘t 2006). 
145 Id. at 741. 
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consent to search a vehicle in order for the People to meet the heavy 
burden in establishing that consent was granted.146  A ―roving patrol 
is not the functional equivalent of the border,‖ therefore, searches and 
―questions at the border without probable cause have no bearing on 
the roving patrol stop.‖147  In People v. LaRose, the court suppressed 
handgun evidence found in the trunk and center console of a ve-
hicle.148  A Border Patrol agent was performing a roving patrol and 
stopped a car that did not violate any traffic laws.149  The court held 
that when the agent had no further concerns about smuggling or 
aliens he simply ―lacked the authority to ask further investigatory 
questions‖ which led to a the search of the trunk and the vehicle.150  
However, in People v. Carillo,151 the court denied a motion to sup-
press cocaine evidence found in a car.152  While on a roving patrol, 
the Border Patrol agent pulled the defendant over for a traffic viola-
tion.153  The occupant was discovered to be an illegal alien.154  An 
agent is authorized to inquire about citizenship and any reasonably 
suspicious circumstances which may lead to the discovery that an au-
tomobile occupant is an illegal alien.155  Based upon these circums-
tances, the court held the agent had authority to obtain voluntary con-
sent and perform a search.156 
In New York, Border Patrol agents can enforce state law ―by 
making warrantless arrests for offenses committed in the agent‘s 
presence and carrying out warrantless searches when constitutionally 
permissible.‖157  In People v. Boyea,158 a Border Patrol agent on a 
roving patrol pulled a car over and smelled marijuana the driver ad-
mitted to have smoked.159  This admission provided probable cause to 
 
146 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548. 




151 686 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 1999). 
152 Id. at 116. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 117. 
156 Carillo, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 117. 
157 Boyea, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 157. 
158 844 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2007). 
159 Id. at 158. 
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search the trunk so consent was not necessary.160 
Border Patrol agents have the freedom to patrol and conduct 
all necessary job functions within the scope of their limited authority.  
However, once a conscious or unconscious attempt is made to go 
beyond their authority, the tendency of New York courts seems to 
shift sharply in favor of defendants.  It appears the state courts are 
highly inflexible regarding improperly substantiated action taken by 
Border Patrol employees against road travelers in New York. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In People v. Banisadr,161 the court determined reasonable sus-
picion was established in a matter concerning a roving border patrol 
vehicle stop, in which the defendant had broken no traffic laws and 
made no attempt to evade a Border Patrol agent.162  This determina-
tion seems to be incorrect.  The facts of the case may provide some 
factors necessary to establish reasonable suspicion such as: proximity 
to the border, known smuggling in the area, defendant‘s posture or 
stiffness, defendant‘s failure to acknowledge the sighted agent driv-
ing alongside his vehicle, and the appearance of the defendant.163  
The defendant was driving in a new Ford Focus rental car and was 
traveling alongside others driving in the defendant‘s Ford Explorer 
truck.164  Both vehicles had out-of-state license plates.165  However, it 
seems a highly ambitious and arduous feat to ascertain how a person 
safely driving near an international border in a rented out-of-state ve-
hicle, with no occupants, would initiate the determination of an ob-
jectively suspicious activity rather than a simple commonplace occur-
rence.     
The curious issue the court seemed to ignore was that the 
Border Patrol agent pulled over the smaller car.166  Drug smugglers 
logically would not be inclined to travel in a subcompact vehicle.  
Mathematically, more cargo space usually equates to a higher payl-
oad.  Further, the Border Patrol agent testified that, prior to the ve-
 
160 Id. (stating the consent granted simply ―provided an additional basis for the search‖). 
161 No. 2010-079, 2011 WL 2022735 (St. Lawrence Cnty. Ct. May 23, 2011). 
162 Id. at *3, 5. 
163 Id. at *1-2. 
164 Id. at *2-3. 
165 Id. at *2. 
166 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *2. 
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hicle stop, he received information over the radio regarding registra-
tion on both vehicles.167  While he stated the ―lighter skinned male‖ 
driving the Ford Explorer did not match the description he received 
regarding the actual registered owner, it seemed more than a little odd 
that the ―middle-eastern looking‖ defendant in a rental subcompact 
car was whom he decided to stop instead.168  It is more plausible that 
with all his training, the Border Patrol agent would have assessed a 
higher level of reasonable suspicion about an out-of-state truck in a 
known smuggling area being driven by someone whose description 
did not match the actual owner.  Given these facts, there is a strong 
possibility the Border Patrol agent here was working off a hunch or a 
bias, which is not a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion to in-
itiate a roving border patrol traffic stop.169  Even assessing the totality 
of the circumstances, the vehicle stopped by the Border Patrol agent 
was an illogical choice.  The court should have raised this issue to 
consider whether reasonable suspicion was truly established or if pre-
judice played a role in the arrest of Mr. Banisadr. 
The court should have assessed whether the traffic stop in-
quiry was too expansive.  The defendant allegedly verified his citi-
zenship to the Border Patrol agent and explained he had traveled 
from Maryland and was simply on his way back.170  Because no traf-
fic violations occurred,171 the Border Patrol agent should have 
stopped his inquiry at this point.172  If he wanted the investigation to 
go any further, local law enforcement officers should have been noti-
fied due to the Border Patrol agent‘s limited authority and the fact no 
crime or traffic violation was committed in his presence.173  It strong-
 
167 Id. 
168 Id.  Moments before the traffic stop in an area known for drug smuggling, the driver of 
the Ford Explorer was verified by the patrol agent as not matching the description of the per-
son the truck was registered to and this blatant and more suspicious discrepancy appears to 
have been simply ignored.  Id.  The rental car did not and could not have a similar driver dis-
crepancy issue.  See id. 
169 See LaRose, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (stating a hunch is not enough to establish reasonable 
suspicion). 
170 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *2. 
171 Id. at *3. 
172 See Carillo, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82 (stating 
that without probable cause or consent a Border Patrol agent is limited to questioning about 
citizenship and suspicious circumstances). 
173 See LaRose, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 638.  On roving patrols, Border Patrol agents not trained 
on New York laws must ask for local police assistance; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
2.15 (7) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.20 (1)(a) and (c) (McKinney 2005). 
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ly appears that reasonable suspicion was improperly ascertained.  The 
court seemed to allow extraordinarily low criteria to be met when it 
held that reasonable suspicion was established.  The Fourth Amend-
ment forbids law enforcement to stop cars at random.174  The problem 
with setting such a low threshold in ascertaining the totality of the 
circumstances is it could lead to increased arbitrary actions by Border 
Patrol agents on roving patrols. 
The court was correct in holding the search of the vehicle was 
improper.175  As the court pointed out, if the defendant did grant con-
sent to search the vehicle, this did not authorize the opening of the 
suitcase in the trunk.176  Besides, one can only imagine how many 
drug smugglers would actually consent to the opening of a suitcase 
containing pounds of marijuana.  The key issue was that the Border 
Patrol agent did not present enough credible testimony on how con-
sent was obtained to open the suitcase.177  The court was simply faced 
with ―wildly different versions‖ of what occurred at the traffic stop in 
question.178 
The fact that the passenger in the patrol car at the time of the 
incident was the brother of the Patrol Agent‘s ex-girlfriend seemed to 
add more credibility to the defendant‘s testimony.179  One could easi-
ly assume that after improperly seizing the marijuana in the car, the 
Border Patrol agent drew his gun and screamed at the defendant pos-
sibly to impress his friend sitting in the patrol car.180  Additionally, 
the Border Patrol agent took no additional measures to validate his 
testimony such as obtaining a signed ―consent to search form‖ from 
the defendant.181   
The court correctly held the People failed to meet their heavy 
burden of showing that voluntary consent was obtained through clear 
and convincing evidence.182  Therefore, the marijuana evidence and 
 
174 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 
883 (stating random automobile stops are impermissible under the Fourth Amendment). 
175 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *6. 
176 Id. at *5. 
177 Id. at *6. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at *3. 
180 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *3. 
181 See Hall, 2006 WL 1341016, at *4.  The court indicated a consent form to search the 
vehicle could have been utilized, but was not, which weakened the prosecutor‘s case.  Id. 
182 Banisadr, 2011 WL 2022735, at *6. 
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the subsequent conversations the defendant had with the State Police 







183 Id. at *6; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 (explaining evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be utilized). 
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